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APPENDIX A

Rule 13.4

IDAHO COURT RULES

issued by the clerk of the court did not reinvest the trial court with jurisdiction to rule
upon its own sua sponte motion to reconsider
its prior order granting a new trial. Syth v.
Parke, 121 Idaho 162, 823 P2d 766 (1991).

Review of District Court's Order upon
Remand.
Although a district court's order upon remand which dismissed one defendant in a
two-defendant c~se, ordinarily would have
•J

~

Rule 1,J

required a certificate of finality for <lppel/review of the dismissal, the Supre 111 e r. " 1('
. .
>
d
,ll\fl·t
d eemed t h e d JStnct courts or er as f"unct ·
.
I
.fi
a ll y equ1va ent to a cert! cate of fi n 2.Ji! vIIHi,
11
cause appellate jurisdiction wa s fu!J,,. ,,,·. _ eSI·(
1 1
when the appeal was initially filed and th,,
court perceived no Just reason to delay con,· •
1
eration on appeal of the dismissal order. 1
sen v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare. j ;(;
Idaho 758, 779 P.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1989)

Iii-\

Rule 13.4. Defogatfon of juri§diction to di§trict court during an
appeat
During a permissive appeal under Rule 12 I.A.R. or an appeal from a
partial judgment certified as final under Rule 54(b) I.R.C.P., the Supreme
Court may, by order, delegate jurisdiction to the district court to take spccilil'.
actions and rule upon specific matters, which may include jurisdiction lo
conduct a trial of issues. A motion for an order under this rule rnay be fil, •d
wi th the Supreme Court by any party in the district court action or Ilic
administrative proceeding. (Adopted March 27, 1989, effective July 1, 198!)·
amended March 9, 1999, effective July 1, 1999.)
'
JR::l\.llle 13.5. §tJipufaHon frnr v acatforri., irever§a]l ort modnfi.cation of

judgment.
Upon stipulation of a ll affected parties that a criminal or civi l judgment o/'
the trial court or administrative agency may be vacated, reversed, modifi<~d
or remanded for further hearings, the court may enter a n order accomp]i:;hing the stipulated result without briefs, oral arg9111ent, or an opin ion oft he
court. An order entered by the court pursuant to such a s tipulation slrnll not
be considered as precedent for any purpose other than a resolution of that.
appea l. The clerk of the court shall issue a remittitur for the order unr k r
Rule 38 in the s ame manner as a rernittitur on an opinion of the courl.
(Adopt ed March 23, 1990, effective July 1, 1990; amended March 20, 19D t ,
effective July 1, 1991.)
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STATUTORY NOTE§
Compiler's Notes. The Supreme Court
Order of March 20, 1991, effective July 1,

1991 renumber ed form er Rule 33.l as J/111,13.5.

Rule 14. Time for filing appeal§.
All appeals p ermitted or authorized by these rules, except a s provided in
Rule 12, shall be taken a nd made in the manner and within the time limits
as follows:
(a) Appeal § From the District Court. Any appeal as a matter ofrighf.
from the distri ct court may be made only by physically filin g a notice of
a ppeal with the clerk of the district court within 42 days from the dnle
evidenced by the filin g s ta mp of the clerk of the court on any judgment or
order of the district court a ppealable as a matter of right in any civil or
566
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Hule 14

Rule 14

IDAHO APPELLATE RULES

criminal action. The time for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in
nn action is terminated by the filing of a timely motion which, if granted;

could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in the
action (except motions under Rule 60 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
or motions regarding costs or attorneys fees), in which case the appeal
period for all judgments or orders commences to run upon the date of the
clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion. The time for an
;1ppeal from any criminal judgment, order or sentence in an action is
terminated by the filing ofa motion within fourteen (14) days of the entry of
the judgment which, if granted, could affect the judgment, order or sentence
in the action, in which case the appeal period for the judgment and sentence
commences to run upon the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order
deciding such motion. In a criminal case, the time to file an appeal is
l'Jl Jarged by the length of time the district court actually retains jurisdiction
pursuant to Idaho Code. When the court releases its retained jurisdiction or
places the defendant on probation, the time within which to appeal shall
commence to run. Provided, if a criminal judgment imposes the sentence of
death, the time within which to file a notice of appeal does not commence to
run until the death warrant is signed and filed by the court.
(b) Appeals JF'rcom.:1JtJ1 Aclminfotrative Agency. An appeal as a matter
of' right from an administrative agency may be made only by physically filing
a notice of appeal with the Public Utilities Commission or the Industrial
Commission within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of
the clerk or secretary of the administrative agency on any decision, order or
award appealable as a matter of right. The time for an appeal from such
decision, order or award of the industrial commission is terminated by a
timely motion for rehearing or reconsideration of the decision or order
which, if granted, could affect the decision, order or award (except motions
regarding costs or attorneys fees), in which case the appeal period commences to run upon the date of the filing stamp on the order or decision
denying such motion or the decision on rehearing or reconsideration. The
lime for an appeal from such decision, order or award of the public utilities
commission begins to run when an application for rehearing is denied, or, if
the application is granted, after the date evidenced by the filing stamp on
the decision on rehearing. (Adopted March 25, 1977, effective July 1, 1977;
amended March 31, 1978, effective July 1, 1978; amended April 3, 1981,
e/Jective July 1, 1981; amended April 18, 1983, effective July 1, 1983;
nmended March 30, 1984, effective July 1, 1984; amended March 21, 2007,
eflective July 1, 2007; amended March 29, 2010, effective July 1, 2010.)
STATUTORY NOTE§
Compilet·';; Note5. The words in parenthesr.,s so appeared in the rule as promulgated.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In this case, the State has conceded that, if the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in
Padilla v. Kentucky 1 applies to Mr. lcanovic's claims on appeal, the district court erred in

dismissing Mr. lcanovic's petition for post-conviction relief in light of the Padilla Opinion.
(See Respondent's Brief, p.21 n.3.) The sole contention of the State on appeal is that

the Padilla Opinion does not apply to Mr. lcanovic's case in light of the modified
retroactivity analysis from Teague v. Lane,2 as adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in
Rhoades v. State. 3 This means that the sole question presented on appeal for this

Court's resolution is the limited legal question of what law applies to Mr. lcanovic's
claims on appeal.

Mr. lcanovic submits that, because Padilla clearly applies to

Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is undisputed
that the district court erred in dismissing his petition.
First, the retroactivity analysis in Teague/Rhoades only comes into play when the
decision in question is issued after the petitioner's underlying judgment of conviction
has become final. Where the underlying judgment is not yet final at the time of the
issuance of an opinion, that opinion applies to the case under well-established law.
Because Mr. lcanovic's underlying conviction was not final at the time Padilla was
issued, the Opinion in Padilla applies to Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction petition.

1
2
3

Padilla v. Kentucky,_ U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130 (2010).

1

Second, even if Mr. lcanovic's judgment of conviction was final at the time Padilla
was issued, the Padilla Opinion would apply to Mr. lcanovic's case because the Padilla
Opinion did not announce a new rule, but merely applied an old rule to a new set of
factual circumstances.

Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, reviewing courts give

retroactive application to a decision where an old rule is applied to a new set of facts,
and therefore Padilla would apply to Mr. lcanovic's substantive claims in postconviction.
Finally, even if the Padilla Opinion announced a new rule of law, under Idaho's
independent review for retroactive application as set forth in Rhoades, Idaho's unique
jurisprudence requires that such an alteration to the fundamental guarantee of
competent counsel be deemed a watershed rule under Idaho law.

Given this,

Mr. lcanovic submits that the Padilla Opinion would apply to the resolution of the legal
issues raised in his post-conviction petition.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. lcanovic's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUES
1.

Was Mr. lcanovic's underlying judgment of conviction not final at the time of the
issuance of the Padilla Opinion, rendering the Padilla Opinion controlling over
Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction claims and further rendering modified approach to
the Teague analysis as adopted in Rhoades inapplicable to this case?

2.

Assuming, arguendo, that the Teague/Rhoades standard for retroactivity applies
to this case, did the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla articulate a new rule, or
articulate an old rule applicable to a new set of facts?

3.

Assuming, arguendo, that the Padilla Court articulated a new rule, was this rule a
watershed rule under Idaho's unique jurisprudence, therefore rendering the rule
in Padilla subject to retroactive application?

3

ARGUMENT
I.

Mr. lcanovic's Underlying Judgment Of Conviction Was Not Final At The Time Of The
Issuance Of The Padilla Opinion, Rendering The Padilla Opinion Controlling Over
Mr. lcanovic's Post-Conviction Claim And The Modified Approach To The Teague
Analysis As Adopted In Rhoades Inapplicable To This Case

A

Introduction
The State has asserted on appeal that the modified Teague standard, as

articulated in Rhoades, applies to this Court's determination of what law to apply to the
legal issues in this appeal. However, the State misses a critical point in the analysis that the Teague/Rhoades retroactivity analysis only applies where the defendant's
underlying judgment of conviction is final at the time of the announcement of the
precedent at issue. Where the defendant's underlying judgment is not yet final at the
time of the issuance of an opinion, that opinion applies to the resolution of the
underlying substantive issues. Because Mr. lcanovic's conviction was not yet final at
the time the Padilla Opinion was issued, it clearly applies to his post-conviction claims
and to this Court's review under well-established law.

B.

The Standard For Whether The Retroactivity Analysis Under Teague/Rhoades
Applies To The Determination Of The Law Governing A Case Is Whether The
Opinion In Question Was Issued Before Or After The Defendant's Underlying
Conviction Became Final Under State Law
The modified standard from Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), as applied in

Idaho under Rhoades, only applies to cases where the defendant is seeking collateral
review of a judgment and the underlying judgment was already final at the time of the
lssuance of the opinion at issue. Where the underlying judgment of conviction is not

4

final at the time of the issuance of an opinion, stare decisis principles mandate that the
opinion would apply to the defendant's post-conviction claims in such a case.
In Rhoades v. State, the Idaho Supreme Court was confronted with the question
of whether to apply the Teague standard to collateral review in cases where the
defendant/petitioners' underlying judgments of conviction were final. See Rhoades v.
State, 149 Idaho 130, 133-139 (2010). In Rhoades, the petitioners sought retroactive

application of the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Ring v. Arizona 4 to collateral review of
the petitioners' sentences of death. Id. at 132. In each of the petitioners' cases, the
underlying judgments of conviction were all final prior to the announcement of the Ring
Opinion. Id.
In explaining the crux of the Teague holding, the Idaho Supreme Court in
Rhoades correctly recognized that the retroactivity principles from Teague only apply to

those cases where the underlying judgment was already final at the time the case law in
question was announced. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 134, 138. The Rhoades Court held
that, "Under Teague, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are not applicable to
those cases that have become final before the new rule was announced." Id. at
134 (emphasis added). Further, the Rhoades Court noted that previous Idaho cases
restricting retroactive application of precedent were limited to cases where the
defendant's judgment was final before the issuance of the opinion at issue. Id. at 136138.

Additionally, the Rhoades Court emphasized policies regarding finality of

judgments when adopting the modified Teague standard articulated in Rhoades. Id. at
138.

4

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
5

This is consistent with the express terms of the Teague Opinion itself. From the
outset, the retroactivity question addressed by Teague is limited to those cases that
were final at the time the decision in question was announced. This is encapsulated in
the Teague Court's own definition of what it means to be a new rule, holding that "a
case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the
time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague, 489 U.S. at 302 (emphasis

added). Additionally, the Teague Court noted what it means for an underlying judgment
of conviction to be "final" for purposes of retroactivity analyses. A judgment is final for
such purposes where, "the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of
appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had lapsed."

Id. at 295

(quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258, n.1 (1986)) (emphasis added).

This is

consistent with the manner in which Idaho courts determine the finality of judgment,
finding that a judgment becomes final upon expiration of the time in which to appeal if
no appeal is actually taken from the underlying judgment. See, e.g., State v. Jakoski,
139 Idaho 352, 355 (2003) (noting that the defendant's conviction became final
following the expiration of his time to appeal from his judgment in light of the
defendant's failure to appeal).
With regard to those cases where the defendant's underlying judgment of
conviction was not yet final at the time the case law in question was issued, that case
generally must have retroactive application - both on direct and collateral review. The
Court in Teague noted that, under its prior opinion in Griffith v. Kentucky, "a new rule for
the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state
or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in

6

which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past."

Id. at 304-305

(quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)) (emphasis added).
That an underlying judgment is not final until the expiration of the time to file a
direct appeal is further articulated under the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Jiminez v.

Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009). In Jiminez, the Court held that finality of judgments,
for purposes of collateral review under federal habeas, is expressly defined as, "the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review."

Id. at 119 (emphasis added). Until the expiration of the time in which a defendant may
seek direct review, "the 'process of direct review' has not 'com[e] to an end' and 'a
presumption of finality and legality' cannot yet have 'attache[d] to the conviction and
sentence."' Id. at 119-120 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,887 (1983)); see

also Caspari v. Bolen, 510 U.S. 383, 390-391 (1994) (defendant's underlying conviction
was not final for purposes of retroactivity until availability of direct appeal was
exhausted).
The Griffith standard for retroactive application of precedent to cases where the
underlying judgment is not yet final has also been expressly adopted by the Idaho
Supreme Court in determining whether case law applies to cases not yet final at the
time of issuance of the opinion.

See, e.g., State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 515

(201 O); State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 795 (1993). Idaho appellate courts have
consistently articulated that, where the case law in question is announced prior to the
underlying judgment of conviction becoming final, even cases articulating a new rule for
the conduct of criminal proceedings must be applied in resolving the substantive issues

7

presented by such a case. See, e.g., Frederick, 149 Idaho at 515; State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209,228 (2010); Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418-419 (1991).
While the State has suggested to this Court that the retroactivity question turns
on the time of the alleged error, rather than on the time at which the defendant's
underlying conviction has become final, the United States Supreme Court has already
considered - and rejected - similar claims in reviewing the applicability of Teague. See
Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 81-85 (1994) (see also Respondent's Brief, p.17

(tacking applicability of Padilla Opinion to the time at which trial counsel provides advice
regarding entry of plea)). In Powell, the Nevada Supreme Court had held that a U.S.
Supreme Court opinion regarding constitutional requirements for probable cause
determinations did not apply to the defendant's case because the opinion was issued
after the defendant's arrest. Id. at 83. Thus, the underlying Nevada opinion used the
time of the alleged constitutional violation as the point at which to measure retroactivity,
rather than the point in time at which the defendant's underlying conviction was final.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Powell held this was error. The question for whether
the retroactivity analysis from Teague applied was whether the defendant's conviction
was final at the time that the opinion at issue was announced - not whether the
precedent existed at the time of the alleged violation.

Powell, 511 U.S. at 84-85

(emphasis added). In cases where the underlying conviction was not yet final at the
time the rule is announced, the standard from Griffith controls and the defendant is
entitled to the benefit of that rule. Id.

C.

Mr. lcanovic's Underlying Judgment Of Conviction Was Not Final At The Time
The Opinion In Padilla Was Issued, And Therefore Padilla Governs His Claims
On Appeal

8

From the outset, the State in this case has never asserted that Mr. lcanovic's
underlying judgment of conviction was final at the time Padilla v. Kentucky, __ U.S.
_ _ , 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) was announced, which is a condition precedent to the
applicability of the retroactivity standards contained within the Teague/Rhoades
analysis.

(See Respondent's Brief, generally.) This is likely because Mr. lcanovic's

underlying judgment of conviction was not final at the time Padilla was issued, and
therefore Padilla applies to Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction claim under Idaho law.
It is undisputed, and was previously found by the district court in this case, that,
while

Mr.

lcanovic's

underlying

judgment

of

conviction

was

entered

on

September 2, 2009, the district court retained jurisdiction over his case, and the court
did not enter its order placing Mr. lcanovic on probation until February 18, 2010 - within
the court's period of retained jurisdiction. 5 (R., pp.4-5, 7-8, 15-16.) Under Idaho law
that was operative at the time, Mr. lcanovic's judgment of conviction was not final until
42 days from the court's order placing him on probation. Because the Padilla Opinion
was issued prior to the expiration of 42 days from the court's probation order, this
Opinion applies to Mr. lcanovic's contentions within his post-conviction petition.
Under the version of I.AR. 14(a) that was operative throughout Mr. lcanovic's
underlying criminal proceedings, the act of retaining jurisdiction by the district court
tolled the time from which to appeal from any substantive issues relating to an

5

This Court may wish to note that the State has incorporated this same accounting of
the underlying procedural facts in Mr. lcanovic's case in its Respondent's Brief. (See
Respondent's Brief, p.1.)

9

underlying judgment of conviction. See Appendix A 6 The version of Idaho Appellate
Rule 14(a) that was operative at the time of the underlying criminal proceedings in
Mr. lcanovic's case provided in pertinent part that:
In a criminal case, the time to file an appeal is enlarged by the length of
time the district court actually retains jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code.
When the court releases its retained jurisdiction or places the
defendant on probation, the time within which to appeal shall
commence to run.
See 2010 (emphasis added) I.AR. 14(a)7, Appendix A
Cases interpreting this provision uniformly held that the district court's action of
retaining jurisdiction in a criminal case operated to toll the 42-day period in which to file
an appeal from the underlying judgment until the expiration of the court's period of
retained jurisdiction and the court's relinquishment of jurisdiction or grant of probation in
that case.

See, e.g., State v. Ward, 150 Idaho 446, 448 (Ct. App. 201 0); State v.

Schultz, 147 Idaho 675, 677 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Wargi, 119 Idaho 292, 293
(Ct. App. 1991). Thus, it is only after the expiration of the period of retained jurisdiction

6

For ease of this Court's reference, the version of I.AR. 14 that existed at the time of
the proceedings in Mr. lcanovic's case has been appended to this brief.
7
This Court may wish to note that the provisions of I.AR. 14(a) with regard to the time
within which to file an appeal where the district court has retained jurisdiction have since
been altered. The current version of the rule provides that, "If, at the time of judgment,
the district court retains jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2601 (4), the length of
time to file an appeal from the sentence contained in the criminal judgment shall be
enlarged by the length of time between the entry of the judgment of conviction and entry
of the order relinquishing jurisdiction or placing the defendant on probation; provided,
however, that all other appeals challenging the judgment must be brought within 42
days of that judgment." I.AR. 14(a). However, this revision does not apply to
Mr. lcanovic's underlying criminal proceedings, as the amendment was not effective
until July 1, 2011, which is well after both the district court's order retaining jurisdiction
and the court's order placing Mr. lcanovic on probation; and further because
"[p]rocedural rules in criminal cases that could affect substantial rights" are given
prospective, rather than retroactive application. See, e.g., State v. McLeskey, 138
Idaho 691, 695 (2003).
10

that the time to file a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment began to run under
the version of I.AR. 14 that was operative at the time of the criminal proceedings in
Mr. lcanovic's case. Id.
The district court retained jurisdiction over Mr. lcanovic's case, and did not enter
its order placing him on probation until February 18, 2010.

(R., pp.4-5, 7-8, 15-16.)

Therefore, Mr. lcanovic had 42 days from the date the district court placed him on
probation before his underlying judgment of conviction became final under Teague.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 295.

Under the law operative at the time, the date upon which

Mr. lcanovic's conviction became final was April 1, 2010 - 42 days from the district
court's order placing him on probation.

Although by the slimmest of margins,

Mr. lcanovic's conviction was not yet final on the date the Padilla Opinion was
announced on March 31, 2010. Given that Mr. lcanovic's conviction was not yet final at
the time of the Padilla Opinion, this Opinion applies to his post-conviction claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel under well-established principles of retroactivity. See
Teague, 489 U.S. at 304-305; Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.

II.

Assuming, Arguendo, That The Teague/Rhoades Standard For Retroactivity Applies To
This Case, The U.S. Supreme Court In Padilla Did Not Articulate A New Rule, But
Rather Articulated An Old Rule Applicable To A New Set Of Facts. And Therefore The
Padilla Opinion Governs Mr. lcanovic's Post-Conviction Claim
A.

Introduction
The U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Padilla did not announce a new rule of law.

Rather, this Opinion was nothing more than the application of prior, well-established
case law to a new set of facts. The Padilla Opinion was merely a further elaboration of
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entrenched legal principles from the Court's prior Opinions in Strickland v. Washington,

8

Hill v. Lockhart9, and I.N.S. v. St. Cyr10. Because Padilla did not announce a new rule,

but instead merely applied well-established legal principles to new facts, the Opinion
should be given retroactive application by this Court.

B.

The U.S. Supreme Court In Padilla Did Not Articulate A New Rule, But Rather
Articulated An Old Rule Applicable To A New Set Of Facts, And Therefore The
Padilla Opinion Governs Mr. lcanovic's Post-Conviction Claim

1.

Under The Federal Standard For Whether A Rule Constitutes A "New
Rule" For Purposes Of Retroactivity Analysis, The U.S. Supreme Court
Opinion In Padilla Did Not Articulate A New Rule, But Merely Applied WellEstablished Case Law To A New Set Of Facts, Thus Rendering
Retroactive Application Appropriate

Mr. lcanovic asserts that the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in Padilla did not

announce a new rule of law, and therefore this Opinion applies retroactively.
As has been noted, Padilla existed prior to the time that Mr. lcanovic's underlying
judgment of conviction became final, and therefore it applied to the post-conviction
proceedings relating to that judgment.

However, even assuming that Mr. lcanovic's

underlying judgment of conviction was final at the time the Padilla Opinion was
announced, he asserts that Padilla did not announce a new rule, and therefore the
Opinion would apply to resolve the underlying issue in Mr. lcanovic's post-conviction.
The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated the three-part analysis under Teague in
order to determine the retroactive application of a rule of law:
In determining whether a state prisoner is entitled to habeas relief, a
federal court should apply Teague by proceeding in three steps. First, the
8

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
10
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).

9
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court must ascertain the date on which the defendant's conviction and
sentence became final for Teague purposes. Second, the court must
"[s]urve[y] the legal landscape as it then existed," and "determine whether
a state court considering [the defendant's] claim at the time his conviction
became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude
that the rule he seeks was required by the Constitution." Finally, even if
the court determines that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule,
the court must decide whether that rule falls within one of the two narrow
exceptions to the nonretroactivity principle.
Caspari v. Bolen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
Under the retroactivity standard articulated in Teague, new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure are not applicable to cases that have become final before the new
rules were announced. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 134. "[A] case announces a new rule if
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became final." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. "Under the Teague framework, an old rule
applies on both direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally only applicable
to cases that are still under direct review."

Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416

(2007). Put another way, if a case does not announce a new rule, but rather applies a
well-established rule to a new set of facts, then the opinion is to be applied retroactively.
See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380-381 (2000).

At base, the Padilla Opinion is nothing more than the application of legal
principles that were well-established at the time of the Opinion to the set of facts that
were before the court. Three primary cases that pre-dated Padilla formed the primary
substance of the Opinion's rationale, and dictated the result in the Padilla case. First
and foremost, the Padilla Opinion is nothing more than a straight application of the
general principles set forth in Strickland v. Washington, which has long been the

13

standard by which claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have been measured.

See Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1480-1486.
Mr. lcanovic contends that the analysis from the United States Supreme Court in

Williams v. Taylor is controlling on this point. The Williams Opinion dealt with the issue
of whether a refinement of Strickland was "clearly established precedent" for purposes
of federal review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).

Williams, 529 U.S. at 379-380. While the Williams decision was rendered in the context
of AEDPA, the Court was clear that the standards codified by this act were the same as
those employed in Teague for determining whether an opinion announced a new rule of
law.

Id. at 380 ("It is perfectly clear that AEDPA codifies Teague to the extent that

Teague requires federal habeas courts to deny relief that is contingent upon a rule of
law not clearly established at the time the state conviction became final.").

In light of

this, the Williams Court applied the same analysis as Teague to the question of whether
the refinement to Strickland at issue was clearly established law.
As a starting point, the Court in Williams recognized that old rules under Teague
may be sufficiently clear even if these rules are expressed in terms of a generalized
standard as opposed to a bright-line rule:
If the rule in question is one which of necessity requires a case-by-case
examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of specific
applications without saying that those applications themselves create a
new rule . . . . Where the beginning point is a rule of this general
application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a
myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a
result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by
precedent.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 382 (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308-309 (1992)
(KENNEDY, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
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Thereafter, the Williams Court concluded that the general rule provided in
Strickland for measuring whether a defendant has received constitutionally adequate

counsel fell squarely within such a category:
It is past question that the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as "clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States." That the Strickland test "of necessity requires a case-bycase examination of the evidence," obviates neither the clarity of the rule
nor the extent to which the rule must be seen as "established" by this
Court. This Court's precedent "dictated" that the Virginia Supreme Court
apply the Strickland test at the time that court entertained Williams'
ineffective-assistance claim. And it can be hardly said that recognizing the
right to effective assistance of counsel "breaks new ground or imposes a
new obligation on the States."
Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (internal citations omitted).
Padilla was, by the express terms of the Opinion itself, nothing more than a

straight-forward application of Strickland to the facts in the defendant's case.

See

Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1480-1486. This was merely the Court applying a general standard

that inherently required a case-by-case analysis in practical application.

Under

Williams, such an opinion does not articulate a new rule, but rather applies well-

established legal standards to a novel factual situation. See also U.S. v. Orocio, 645
F.3d 630, 638-639 (3d. Cir. 2011); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 903
(Mass. 2011) (holding that the analysis in Padilla was, "the definitive application of an
established constitutional standard on a case-by-case basis, incorporating evolving
professional norms ... to new facts," and that it was therefore not a new rule.). In such
cases, retroactive application of the rule is required.
Additionally, the Padilla Court's application of Strickland was similarly dictated by
two prior U.S. Supreme Court cases - Hill v. Lockhart and I.N.S. v. St. Cyr. Both of
these cases were cited as authority underpinning the decision in Padilla. See Padilla,
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130 S.Ct. at 1480-1486. In Hill, the U.S. Supreme Court extended its analysis under
Strickland to challenges to guilty pleas based upon claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).

And, in the subsequent U.S.

Supreme Court Opinion in /.N.S. v. St. Cyr, the Court elaborated on the interplay
between criminal guilty pleas and the immigration consequences of such pleas.
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322-323 (2001).

In fact, the Court in St. Cyr actually articulated the standards for competent
counsel that would later be developed more fully in Padilla - noting both that the
American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice required that, "if a defendant
would face deportation as a result of a conviction, defense counsel 'should fully advise
the defendant of those consequences,"' and that "competent defense counsel, following
the advice of numerous practice guides," would advice non-citizen clients of the
immigration consequences of a plea.

Id. at 322 n.48, 323 n.50.

That the St. Cyr

Opinion had already set out this standard for competent representation of counsel was
expressly noted by the Padilla Court. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483. The Padilla Opinion
did not announce any new rule, but merely merged its prior statements in Strickland,
Hill, and St. Cyrto hold that competent defense counsel must advise a non-citizen client

as to the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.

Because this is merely the

application of well-established case law to a new factual context, the Padilla Opinion did
not announce a new rule for purposes of retroactivity. See also Orocio, 645 F.3d at
639.
That Padilla did not announce a new rule is also apparent from other aspects of
the Padilla Opinion itself. First, Jose Padilla himself received the benefit of the U.S.
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Supreme Court's Opinion. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486. This direct application of the rule
announced in the Padilla Opinion, without reference to the Teague analysis of
retroactivity, has been held to be an important indicator that the Padilla Court did not
consider this Opinion to articulate a "new rule."

See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 954

N.E.2d 365, 377 (Ill. Ct. App. 2011 ).
Second, the terms of the Opinion demonstrate that the Court contemplated the
retroactive applicability of its decision. The Padilla Court expressly addressed concerns
raised by the Solicitor General regarding the displacement of those convictions already
final that were obtained through guilty pleas. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484-1485. Yet,
rather than respond by stating that the Opinion would not have retroactive application,
the Court instead responded that the impact of retroactive application would likely be
minimal.

Id.

Citing to the absence of a "flood" of litigation in prior cases expanding

upon Strickland, and to the high bar set by the Strickland standard itself, the Padilla
Court concluded that lower courts would be able, under the circumstances identified by
the Solicitor General, to effectively employ the Strickland framework "to separate
specious claims from those with substantial merit."

Id.

Finally, the Padilla Court

expressed skepticism that many final convictions would be disturbed upon retroactive
application, as the standards articulated in the Opinion had been recognized under
"professional norms" for "at least the past 15 years." Id.

This implicit recognition of

retroactive application of the Padilla Opinion has frequently been cited as an important
indication that Padilla did not announce a new rule. See, e.g., Gutierrez, 954 N.E.2d at
377-378; Clarke, 949 N.E.2d at 903; Campos v. State, 798 N.W.2d 565, 569 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2011 ); People v. Nunez, 917 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
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This is further consistent with numerous opinions that have determined that the

Padilla Opinion does not announce a new rule of law, and therefore has retroactive
application. See, e.g., Orocio, 645 F.3d at 637-640; Gutierrez, 954 N.E.2d at 377-378;

Clarke, 949 N.E.2d at 896-904; Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 569-570; Nunez, 917 N.Y.S.2d
at 809; Ex Parte De Los Reyes, 350 S.W.3d 723, 728-729 (Tex. App. 2011).

2.

Even If The Padilla Opinion Announced A "New Rule" Under The Federal
Standard For Purposes Of Retroactivity, Under Idaho's Unique
Jurisprudence. The Padilla Opinion Did Not Announce A New Rule Given
Our Independent Retroactivity Analysis Pursuant To Rhoades

While the State relies very heavily on two federal cases finding that Padilla
articulated a new rule, Mr. lcanovic asserts that these federal cases are of very little
assistance to this Court in its own retroactivity review. This is due to the independent
analysis that this Court conducts regarding whether a rule constitutes a "new rule" for
retroactivity purposes.
Consistent with federal courts, Idaho has provided for retroactive application of
case law where the case in question did not announce a new rule of law, but merely
clarified existing legal standards. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. But, under the Rhoades
Opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held that Idaho applies an independent test
for whether a rule constitutes a "new rule" under Idaho's modified Teague analysis.
The Rhoades Court expressly acknowledged the wide criticism levied against
federal application of the Teague standard with regard to how narrowly these decisions
view what constitutes a new rule of constitutional law. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 138-139.
The Court further recognized that the narrow construction common to the federal courts
conducting habeas corpus review is largely based upon concerns against excessive
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federal interference in state law determinations.

Id.

However, the Idaho Supreme

Court, in reviewing state post-conviction actions, "does not have a similar concern for
comity when interpreting whether a decision pronounces a new rule of law for purposes
of applying Teague." Id. at 139.
Given this, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that Idaho courts must
independently review what constitutes a new rule, and whether a new rule is a
watershed rule, in the exercise of "independent judgment, based upon concerns of this
Court and the 'uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing
jurisprudence."' Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 138-139 (quoting State v. Donato, 135 Idaho
469, (2001)). And, under Idaho's unique jurisprudence, there is even greater reason for
this Court to conclude that Padilla did not announce a new rule for retroactivity
purposes.
In various aspects, Idaho's unique jurisprudence recognizes the intimate relation
between a guilty plea in a criminal case and the immigration consequences that may
flow therefrom. These consequences are "now virtually inevitable for a vast number of
noncitizens convicted of crimes." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1478. The "drastic measure" of
deportation - the modern equivalent of banishment - as it exists now is described by
the Padilla Court as follows:
We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe
"penalty"; but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although
removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless
intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed criminal
convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century. And,
importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal
nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus,
we find it "most difficult" to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the
deportation context. Moreover, we are quite confident that noncitizen
defendants facing a risk of deportation find it even more difficult.
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Id. at 1481-1482 (internal citations omitted).

The Idaho Supreme Court, likely in recognition of the changes in immigration law
rendering deportation nearly inevitable for a vast number of noncitizen defendants,
amended I.C.R. 11 in 2007 to require that district courts "inform all defendants that if the
defendant is not a citizen of the United States, the entry of a plea or making of factual
admissions could have consequences of deportation or removal, inability to obtain legal
citizenship in the United States, or denial of an application for United States citizenship."
I.C.R. 11 (d)(1 ). Idaho's establishment of this requirement as part of the entry of plea
process pre-dates the issuance of the Padilla Opinion, and reflects our state's unique
judgment as to the integral relation between criminal guilty pleas and the immigration
consequences flowing therefrom.

See also Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 569-570

(recognizing the pre-existing requirement for a trial court to advise a defendant
regarding potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea as an indicator that the
Padilla Opinion was not a "new rule" under Minnesota's independent Teague analysis.).
The intimate connection between a guilty plea and resulting deportation
consequences is further reflected in the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in State v.
Tinoco-Perez, 145 Idaho 400, 401-402 (Ct. App. 2008). Although acknowledging that
immigration consequences of a felony conviction had been held to be "collateral" to the
plea, the Court in Tinoco-Perez recognized that the relationship between a criminal
conviction and resulting immigration consequences was a cognizable ground to request
sentencing relief in a criminal case:
Although the risk of deportation or other impact on immigration status is
generally considered a "collateral consequence" of a criminal conviction, it
is nevertheless a very significant consequence for the defendant. Indeed,
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for many non-citizens, any term of imprisonment imposed by the court will
be quite secondary to the immigration consequences in impact on the
defendant's life and future. Therefore, the effect on immigration status is
an appropriate consideration for the trial court in fashioning a sentence or
considering Rule 35 relief.

Tinoco-Perez, 145 Idaho at 402. The Court further tied the significance of immigration
consequences resulting from criminal convictions to the decision of the Idaho Supreme
Court to amend the criminal rules to require that trial courts advise non-citizen
defendants of the potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Id. at 402 n.1.
In light of Idaho's unique jurisprudence that had previously recognized the intimate ties
between criminal convictions and immigration consequences resulting therefrom,
Mr. lcanovic asserts that Padilla did not articulate a new rule under Rhoades.
Additionally, the standards articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA) for
"The Defense Function" have traditionally carried great weight with Idaho appellate
courts with regard to measuring contemporary standards for competency of counsel. In
discussing specifically the right to competent counsel under Article I, § 13 of the Idaho
State Constitution, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "As a beginning point to this
inquiry, this Court recognized the American Bar Association's standards entitled 'The
Defense Function."' Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 635 (1986). The ABA standards
for defense counsel and for the conduct of criminal proceedings have retained a
significant place in Idaho's jurisprudence with regard to measuring competent
representation of trial counsel in numerous opinions, and have often been referred to as
"the starting point" under our Idaho State Constitution in evaluating claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.

See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279-280 (1998);

Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761 (1988); State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 8-9 (1975);
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Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146 (Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,

411 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1981 ).
The Padilla Court noted that, even prior to its Opinion, the American Bar
Association had recognized the necessity of competent defense counsel to advise a
non-citizen defendant of the immigration consequences of his or her plea. Padilla, 130
S. Ct. at 1482. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the same in its prior Opinion in St.
Cyr - which was issued nearly ten years prior to the Padilla Opinion. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.

at 322 n.48.

Because Idaho places special emphasis on the American Bar

Association's promulgated standards for the conduct of criminal trials in determining our
own state constitutional right to counsel, and because these standards recognized the
necessity of competent counsel to advise a client regarding immigration consequences
of a conviction well in advance of the Padilla Opinion, Mr. lcanovic asserts that our·
unique jurisprudence would dictate that Padilla would not be considered a "new rule"
under our independent state review for retroactivity.
While the State places much reliance on an Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion that
had found that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a judicial
recommendation against deportation, Mr. lcanovic submits that this opinion was no
longer controlling law given the intervening changes in the landscape of immigration
law, and its intimate relation with criminal convictions, by the time the Padilla Opinion
was issued. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.16-17.) Specifically, the State relies upon the
opinion in Retamoza v. State 11 to argue that Padilla articulated a new rule. However,
Retamoza was rendered at a time when the interplay between criminal convictions and

11

Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792 (Ct. App. 1994).
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immigration consequences was fundamentally different, and therefore the result from
that case would not be clearly dictated in light of intervening changes to immigration law
as it relates to criminal convictions.
The Retamoza Opinion dealt with, inter a/ia, the issue of whether the petitioner's
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a judicial recommendation against
deportation (..IRAD).

Retamoza, 125 Idaho at 795.

The Retamoza Court then

determined that, because the opportunity for a JRAD dealt with deportation, and
deportation was a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel did not extend to the failure to inform the
petitioner of the potential to seek a JRAD. Id. at 795-797.
However, the Strickland analysis presupposes that trial counsel's obligations may
shift and change over time, and is measured by the contemporaneous state of the law.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (court reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

claim "must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of
the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct."). Given the intervening
changes to immigration law subsequent to Retamoza, it cannot be said that this opinion
dictated the result in subsequent cases where the landscape of immigration law was
drastically altered.
The Retamoza Opinion was issued in 1994 - two years prior to a radical
overhaul of immigration law so as to eliminate the authority of the Attorney General to
grant discretionary relief from deportation in nearly all cases where the non-citizen has
committed a felony offense. See Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1480. As noted by the Padilla
Court, after the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, deportation is
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"practically inevitable" for convictions for most felony offenses.

Id.; see also 8

U.S.C. § 1229b. The Padilla Court then expounded on the effect of these changes:
These changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes
of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal
advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important.
These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law,
deportation is an integral part - indeed, sometimes the most important
part - of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who
plead guilty to specified crimes.
Id.

Additionally, the Padilla Opinion discussed specifically the fact that the JRAD
provisions have been eliminated entirely as of 1990, thus eradicating one of the few
mechanisms to avoid deportation. Id. Therefore, between the time of the acceptance of
the plea at issue in Retamoza - 1988 - and the time of the underlying proceedings in
Mr. lcanovic's case, the landscape of the immigration law had shifted to the point where
there was neither the potential for him to seek a JRAD nor a grant of discretionary relief
from the Attorney General.
Moreover, the Retamoza Opinion was issued prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion in St. Cyr, which noted that "competent defense counsel, following the advice of
numerous practice guides," would advise clients regarding important immigration
consequences of a guilty plea. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323 n.50. This passage from the
U.S. Supreme Court reflects directly the subsequent holding in Padilla, and therefore
the holding in Retamoza would have been altered given this intervening law.
Finally, whether the rule would encompass the overruling of prior precedent has
not been deemed dispositive to the analysis in Idaho regarding whether an opinion
articulates a new rule, or rather an old rule applied to a new set of facts. For example,
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the Idaho Supreme Court in Perry found that it was not announcing a new rule even
though the opinion itself overruled prior case law. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. The Idaho
Supreme Court in Perry expressly disavowed the standards articulated in the Court's
prior decision of Smith v. State, 12 and yet this in no way precluded the Court from
finding that the standards articulated in Perry were not "new" for purposes of retroactive
application under Rhoades. Id. at 226- 228. This is consonant with the holding of other
jurisdictions that have similarly recognized that the mere existence of conflicting
authority does not necessarily mean that a rule is new. See Clarke, 949 N.E.2d at 36;
Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 568-570 (recognizing that Padilla did not announce a new rule

even though it effectively overruled a prior state decision).

Given this, the issue of

whether or not the opinion in question overruled prior case law is not dispositive of the
analysis in Idaho regarding whether an opinion articulates a new rule.
Because Idaho does not necessarily apply the same exacting standards for what
constitutes an old versus a new rule for purposes of retroactivity, Mr. lcanovic asserts
that this Court should find that the decision in Padilla did not announce a new rule. He
further notes that an appellate court in Minnesota - which has the same retroactivity
analysis that was adopted by our Supreme Court in Rhoades - has l1eld that Padilla did
not announce a new rule. See Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 568-570; see also Rhoades,
149 Idaho 136 (adopting the modified Teague standard as adopted by the Minnesota
Supreme Court). Given that Idaho has adopted the same modified standard for review
as that applied by the appellate courts in Minnesota, Mr. lcanovic submits that this Court

12

Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469 (1971).
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should likewise find that Padilla did not announce a new rule under Idaho's unique
jurisprudence.

111.

Assuming, Arguendo, Tl1at The Padilla Court Articulated A New Rule, This Rule
Constitutes A Watershed Rule Under Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence, Therefore
Rendering The Rule In Padilla Subject To Retroactive Application By This Court

A

Introduction
Under Idaho's unique jurisprudence with regard to collateral challenges in post-

conviction, and particularly in light of Idaho's more expansive right to the competent
representation of counsel, Mr. lcanovic submits that the decision in Padilla constituted a
watershed rule. As such, even if the Padilla Opinion announced a new rule of law, this
rule should be given retroactive application by this Court.

B.

Under Idaho's Modified Approach To The Teague Analysis, Idaho Courts Must
Always Determine Whether The Unique Jurisprudence Of Idaho Requires A
Different Result To The Retroactivity Analysis
As was previously noted, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted a modified form of

the Teague analysis in Rhoades. See Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 135-139. However, while
same structural analysis applies in Idaho to issues of retroactivity in cases of a final
judgment, the Rhoades Court did not adopt a reflexive application of Teague with
regard to the meaning of the retroactivity standards at issue.
Instead, the Rhoades Court accepted the invitation of the U.S. Supreme Court in

Danforth v. Minnesota to define each of the terms in the Teague analysis under state
law. In Danforth, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether state courts could modify
the retroactivity analysis it had previously set forth in Teague in deciding whether to
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apply new case law to a collateral challenge where the defendant's underlying
conviction was already final.

Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 267-269 (2008).

The Danforth Opinion concluded that states were free to do so. Id. at 275-282.
Upon remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Danforth elected not to abandon
the general standards of review under Teague in its entirety. Danforth v. State, 761
N.W.2d 493, 495-500 (Minn. 2009).

However, the Minnesota Supreme Court

recognized that a lock-step application of the federal standards regarding the Teague
analysis might not be advisable in its state court determinations on collateral review.
Therefore, the Danforth Court also held that Minnesota courts must independently
review cases to determine whether fundamental fairness requires retroactive application
of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure. Id. at 500.
Following the lead of the Danforth Opinion, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's
subsequent determination on remand to independently define the terms of the Teague
analysis under state law, the Rhoades Court held that it is mandatory for a reviewing
court in Idaho to "independently review requests for newly announced principles of law
under the Teague standard":
We now explicitly adopt the Teague standard in criminal cases on
collateral review. Furthermore, we follow the lead of the Minnesota
Supreme Court and hold that Idaho courts must independently review
requests for retroactive application of newly-announced principles of
law under the Teague standard.
Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 136 (emphasis added).

The Court in Rhoades explained why such independent review was necessary
with regard to state post-conviction claims.

First, the Court noted that, among the

criticisms to the Teague approach was that the U.S. Supreme Court imposed a
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definition of a new rule that was overly broad, and therefore excluded most of the
decisions issued with regard to constitutional questions. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 138.
Second, the Rhoades Court noted the common criticism in how narrowly the U.S.
Supreme Court had defined the two exceptions providing retroactive application for new
rules that were either "substantive rules" or "watershed rules." Id. Finally, and critically,
the Rhoades Court acknowledged that the primary motivator for the strictness of the
Teague standards under federal law was the concern against excessive interference on

the part of the federal courts in state law determinations. The Rhoades Court expressly
acknowledged that, in Idaho, "this Court does not have a similar concern for comity
when interpreting whether a decision pronounces a new rule of law for purposes of
applying Teague." Id. at 139.
Given this, the Idaho Supreme Court expressed throughout Rhoades that it was,
"committed to independently analyzing requests for retroactive application of newlyannounced principles of law with regard to the uniqueness of our state, our constitution,
and our long-standing jurisprudence." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 140.

C.

Under Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence, And In Light Of The Salient Differences
Between Collateral Review Under The UPCPA And Federal Habeas, The Padilla
Opinion Announced A Watershed Rule Entitled To Retroactive Application Given
Idaho's More Expansive Right To Counsel

1.

Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence UPCPA Requires A Lesser Standard For
Watershed Rules With Regard To Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel, As These Claims Generally May Not Be Brought On Direct
Appeal

Mr. lcanovic asserts that, because under Idaho's unique jurisprudence with
regard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court should apply a lesser
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standard for what constitutes a watershed rule than is applied under federal habeas
corpus review pursuant to Teague. This is because such claims generally can only be
brought under Idaho law through a collateral attack under the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act (UPCPA), rather than being brought on direct appeal, and therefore the
concerns of comity and finality that motivate the federal standard for watershed rules do
not apply.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Rhoades noted that only two exceptions apply to
permit retroactive application of new rules of law under Teague - substantive rules of
law, which encompass only those rules that place private, individual conduct beyond
criminal proscription; and watershed rules of fundamental fairness. Rhoades, 149 Idaho
at 138-139.

But the Rhoades Court further noted that the federal courts have

interpreted the exception for watershed rules so narrowly that the "U.S. Supreme Court
has found no watershed rules in the 19 years since it adopted Teague." Id.
The narrow manner in which the Teague Court interprets both exceptions is the
direct result of concerns specific to the context of federal habeas corpus, and
concomitant concerns that the federal courts should not unnecessarily interfere with the
finality of state court decisions. Teague, 489 U.S. at 308-310. This is because federal
habeas corpus, "'is not intended as a substitute for appeal, nor as a device for reviewing
the merits of criminal trials,' but only 'to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems."'

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 292 (1992) (quoting

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (STEVENS, J., concurring)). In fact,
the exhaustion of the claim in state court is a precondition of raising any claim in federal
habeas.

See, e.g., Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 486 (1975).
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This requirement

presupposes that, in nearly all cases, the defendant in federal habeas proceedings will
have already obtained a ruling regarding all issues raised in habeas through the state
appellate courts from which his or her state criminal conviction arose. Id. at 486-490.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Danforth recognized that the unique nature of federal
habeas corpus review may lead some states to apply a lesser standard of review for
retroactivity in light of their own state post-conviction procedures.

In fact, the Court

noted that it was the unique nature of federal habeas corpus review that prompted the
standards underpinning the Teague analysis. "A close reading of the Teague opinion
makes clear that the rule it established was tailored to the unique context of federal
habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in
their own post-conviction proceedings than required by that opinion."
U.S. at 277.

Danforth, 552

In fact, because the Teague retroactivity analysis was so squarely the

product of the particular concerns of the federal court in not disturbing the finality of
state law convictions, the Danforth Court further noted that these same principles of
comity might actually provide a strong basis for state courts to provide much broader
application of precedent in their own state post-conviction actions. Id. at 279-280.
Idaho's

unique jurisprudence

regarding

collateral

challenges

to

criminal

convictions under the UPCPA does not share in the salient features of collateral
challenges under federal habeas that have motivated the federal courts to apply such
rigid and incredibly narrow standards for a watershed rule for purposes of retroactivity.
This is particularly the case with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which
normally cannot be brought on direct review and must instead be brought through postconviction under Idaho's unique jurisprudence and statutory law.
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In Idaho, a defendant may raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel
either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief, but not both.
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 806 (1992). While the defendant may, in theory,

raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the practical reality is
that resolution of such claims almost always turns on facts outside the record on appeal,
and therefore expansion of the record through post-conviction is usually required in
order to properly adjudicate such claims. See, e.g., State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 551552 (2001); Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791 (1985); Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292,
296 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 66-67 (Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549-550 (Ct. App. 1999); State

v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 375-

376 (Ct. App. 1993). Given this, appellate courts in Idaho routinely decline to entertain
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel when they are raised on direct appeal.
Elison, 135 Idaho at 551-552; Santana, 135 Idaho at 66-67; Saxton, 133 Idaho at 549-

550; Mitchell, 124 Idaho at 376.
The requirement that a claim of ineffective assistance be raised through a
petition for post-conviction relief, rather than on direct appeal, is all but inescapable for
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel of the type addressed by Padilla, where the
alleged deficiency relates directly to the private consultation occurring between an
attorney and client regarding the decision whether to plead guilty. See Mitchell, 124
Idaho at 376 (recognizing that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel requiring
development outside the trial record typically include issues as to "the adequacy of
counsel's communications with the defendant."). Under Idaho's unique post-conviction
jurisprudence, such claims would necessarily need to be litigated through collateral
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attacks in post-conviction, rather on direct review, because they hinge on evidentiary
matters outside the record on direct appeal. Therefore, the standards for justiciability of
such claims under Idaho law is the exact opposite as that present in federal habeas
corpus - rather than requiring that such claims be raised in prior proceedings in order to
properly exhaust state remedies, these issues of ineffective assistance of counsel
cannot be raised in any proceeding other than a post-conviction petition under Idaho
law.
Under requirements of exhaustion of remedies, review of any constitutional issue
under federal habeas corpus presupposes that the defendant has already had a prior
opportunity to litigate the claim at issue. Because collateral attacks in post-conviction
are almost always a defendant's first and sole state mechanism to raise claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel of the type described in Padilla, Mr. lcanovic asserts
such claims sufficiently implicate the fundamental fairness of the proceedings so as to
be deemed a watershed rule.

2.

Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence With Regard To Our More Expansive State
Statutory Right To Counsel Requires A Lesser Standard For Watershed
Rules With Regard To Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a defendant is
only guaranteed the right to counsel at "critical stages" of the criminal proceedings.
See, e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87 (2004). However, by statute, Idaho's unique
jurisprudence provides a right to counsel that is broader in scope than that provided
solely under the federal constitution, and therefore reflects a heightened concern for
protection of the right to counsel under Idaho law than inheres under the federal
constitution.
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In addition to having an independent right to counsel under Article I, § 13 of the
Idaho State Constitution, criminal defendants in Idaho have extensive rights to the
assistance of counsel by virtue of statute. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-852. By statute in Idaho,
a criminal defendant has the right to appointed counsel, "to the same extent as a person
having his own counsel is so entitled," and is further entitled to the assistance of
counsel in post-conviction proceedings under most circumstances. See I.C. §§ 19-852,
19-4904.

Idaho's general statutory right to the appointment of counsel grants an

indigent defendant the right to appointment of counsel for any proceeding in which
retained counsel would be entitled to appear. State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278, 281-282
(1992). Moreover, this right exists, regardless of whether the right of appointed counsel
to appear in a proceeding, "comes from constitution, statute, regulation or ordinance."
Id. at 282; see also Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 833-843 (2009). In addition, Idaho

provides for a more expansive right to counsel because Idaho recognizes the right to
counsel in order to pursue a discretionary petition for review before the Idaho Supreme
Court - a right that was expressly rejected under the Sixth Amendment by the U.S.
Supreme Court.

Compare Hernandez, 127 Idaho 687-688; Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.

600, 610-616 (1974).
Especially noteworthy is the fact that, by Idaho's unique jurisprudence and under
our statutory laws, a defendant enjoys a statutory right to counsel in post-conviction
proceedings. See, e.g., Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-793 (2004). This is
quite significant with regard to our state's heightened protection of the right to counsel,
as the right to counsel in post-conviction actions is expressly not recognized under the
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Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,
555-556 (1987).
In fact, the Court in Finley expressly recognized that the standards for the right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment are more restrictive than the very standard that is
in place by statute in Idaho. In Finley, the Court held that the federal constitution does
not require the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant merely because an
atl'luent defendant may retain one for the proceeding in question. Id. at 556.
'"The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal
that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing
effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant
an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the
State's appellate process." Id.
Thus, the federal standard for the right to counsel is expressly more limited than
that afforded to defendants by statute in Idaho - while the Sixth Amendment contains
no guarantee that an indigent defendant has the same right to the representation of
counsel as the affluent one, Idaho recognizes just such a right by operation of I.C. § 19852. See also Young, 122 Idaho at 281-282.
Moreover, once a statutory right to counsel has been conferred under Idaho law,
this right carries with it all the guarantees of effective assistance of counsel as does the
federal right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. See Hernandez v. State,
127 Idaho 685, 687 (1995). As was noted by the Court in Hernandez, the "statutory
right to counsel would be a hollow right if it did not guarantee the defendant the right to
effective assistance of counsel." Id. Therefore, this Court treats the statutory grant of
the right to counsel under Idaho law as inherently conferring the right to the effective
assistance of counsel. Id.
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Because Idaho provides for much broader protection of the right to counsel than
that recognized under the federal constitution, Mr. lcanovic asserts that this Court
should account for this heightened protection when reviewing retroactive application of
new rules of law that involve the right to competent representation of counsel. This is
particularly the case where the rule in question involves issues of critical importance to
the competent representation of criminal defendants, as is the case with Padilla.
The Court in Rhoades has indicated that the standard for watershed rules in
Idaho encompasses review for whether the rule implicates the fundamental fairness of
the proceedings, and that Idaho courts independently review whether a rule would meet
this standard in light of Idaho's jurisprudence and our state constitutional standards.
See Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 134. In light of Idaho's more expansive right to counsel,
both under our constitution and under our statutory laws, Mr. lcanovic asserts that the
standards articulated for competent representation of counsel under Padilla should be
deemed a watershed rule by this Court. 13

13

This Court may also wish to note that, in the Minnesota Court of Appeals case of
Campos v. State, the court indicated that, had the court not already determined that
Padilla did not articulate a new rule, the Opinion may have been deemed a watershed
rule implicating fundamental fairness under its modified Teague analysis pursuant to
Danforth. See Campos, 798 N.W.2d at 571 n.3.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. lcanovic respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 23 rd day of January, 2012.

SARAH E. TOMP~-lt;J
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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